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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the impact of Sovereign 
rating changes on the aggregate stock and bond 
market returns both in emerging and developed 
countries. Rating downgrades in emerging mar-
kets are associated with significant negative 
wealth effects both in the stock and bond mar-
kets. Moreover, the effects of rating down-
grades persist up to six-months after the event. 
In contrast, upgrades in emerging markets con-
vey no information. Rating changes in devel-
oped markets have no significant impact on 
either stock and bond market returns. Rating 
agencies act pro-cyclically, downgrading coun-
tries in bad times and, consequently, contribut-
ing to the instability in emerging markets. 
JEL Classification: F30; G14; G15 
Keywords: Sovereign ratings; Stock markets; 
Bond markets; Event study  
1. INTRODUCTION
This paper studies the long-run performance of 
Sovereign rating changes on the aggregate 
stock and bond market in both emerging and 
developed countries. We analyse separately the 
market response to upgrades and downgrades in 
each market and country.  
The current study is motivated by the fact that, 
investors, in particularly fund managers, are 
increasingly focused on international diversifi-
cation due to financial market integration. Thus, 
it is important to understand country risk and to 
be able to reliably assess the risk of investing in 
different national markets. The formation of 
international portfolios requires a range of fun-
damental inputs for asset allocation decision 
and for active investment strategies. Furthermo-
re, there are major information events that may 
affect the top-down choice of the basic alloca-
tion of funds to different regions and national 
markets. The change of Sovereign ratings is one 
such key event that may trigger substantial 
recompositions of international portfolios. 
Rating agencies have also been pointed out as 
promoters of financial instability. Their pro-
cyclical behavior, upgrading countries in good 
times and downgrading them in bad times, may 
have contributed to magnifying the boom-bust 
pattern in stock markets. Even if rating agencies 
do not behave pro-cyclically, their announce-
ments may still trigger market movements. This 
is because many institutional investors can only 
hold investment grade instruments (i.e. securi-
ties with ratings above a certain threshold). 
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Thus, changes in ratings, downgrading 
(upgrading) Sovereign debt below (above) 
investment grade, may have a drastic impact on 
prices because these rating changes can poten-
tially affect the pool of investors. Rating chan-
ges may also unveil new (private) information 
about a country and consequently they may fuel 
rallies or downturns. This effect is likely to be 
stronger in emerging markets where problems 
of asymmetric information and transparency are 
more severe. 
Studies of Sovereign rating changes have 
mostly focused on the effects of ratings on the 
instruments being rated or on the instruments of 
the institutions being rated. This is the case of 
Cantor and Packer (1996), who examine the 
effects of Sovereign ratings on emerging mar-
ket bond yield spreads. They conduct an event 
study using a short-run window (up to 20 days 
after the event) and find evidence that rating 
agencies’ opinions affect market spreads. A 
statistically significant government bond yield 
change in the expected direction follows the 
announcement of changes in the agencies’ 
Sovereign risk opinions. They also find that the 
impact of rating announcements on spreads is 
much stronger for below-investment-grade than 
for investment-grade Sovereigns. Furthermore, 
rating announcements that are more fully antici-
pated have a larger impact than those that are 
less anticipated. 
Sy (2001) studies the relationship between 
emerging markets Sovereign spreads and 
ratings on their long-term foreign currency 
denominate debt ratings. Using panel data he 
finds that there is a negative association bet-
ween Sovereign spreads and ratings, which has 
been strengthened over the years. There is an 
increasing dispersion of spreads for similar 
rated countries during crisis. This indicates that 
there is increasing discrimination between 
countries during episodes of market turbulence 
which is not based on credit ratings but on other 
factors which investors rely on to differentiate 
between countries. 
There is recent literature that examines whether 
changes in bond ratings affect asset markets 
other than bonds. There may be various chan-
nels of spillover that allow news on one particu-
lar market to affect yields of other securities. 
For example, in the case of the downgrade of 
Sovereign bonds, stock markets can be adver-
sely affected because governments may raise 
taxes on firms (and hurt firms’ future stream of 
profits) to neutralize the adverse budget effect 
of higher interest rates on government bonds 
triggered by the downgrade. 
Dichev and Piotroski (2001) analyze the impact 
of bond rating changes on individual stocks. 
They find evidence of significant negative 
abnormal stock returns following downgrades, 
especially at subsequent earnings announce-
ments. This suggests that the market does not 
fully anticipate the predictable future changes 
in earnings. Stock prices appear to under-react 
to the ratings change announcement, and conti-
nue to drift in the direction of the announce-
ment return for up to one year after the announ-
cement.  
Brooks, Faff, Hillier and Hillier (2002) investi-
gate the impact of Sovereign rating changes on 
the returns of the associated national stock mar-
ket. This study tries to assess whether and to 
what extent the key results documented for cor-
porate bond rating changes on individual 
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stocks, also apply at the aggregate country 
level. They employ an event study methodology 
to detect the abnormal returns resulting from an 
upgrade or downgrade announcement, both on 
foreign and local currency ratings. There is lit-
tle evidence of abnormal stock returns behavior 
following rating upgrades over a short-run 
event window (up to ten days after the event), 
while for rating downgrades (only for foreign 
currency downgrades but not for local currency 
downgrades) the impact is significantly negati-
ve. They also conclude that, irrespective of 
whether returns are denominated in domestic 
currencies or US dollars, the wealth impact of a 
Sovereign rating downgrade holds. Moreover, 
emerging markets do not appear to be particu-
larly more sensitive to Sovereign rating change 
than developed countries. 
Changes in ratings of assets from one country 
can trigger contagious movements in other 
countries. These cross-country contagion 
effects can be large, as was the case of the spil-
lover effects of the Russian default on develo-
ped and developing countries. Rating agencies 
may contribute to these co-movements in finan-
cial markets around the world. 
Cross-country and also cross-security spillover 
effects of rating changes are examined by 
Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002). Their study 
contributes to the literature on contagion and 
international transmission of shocks by exami-
ning the effect of domestic vulnerability, as 
measured by the ratings of credit agencies, on 
the extent of international spillovers. They con-
duct an event study to analyze the evolution of 
a country’s bond market spread (i.e. Sovereign 
bond yield spread relative to the U.S. Treasu-
ries) and stock market spread (domestic stock 
return relative to the U.S. stock market return) 
in a short-run window (10 days) around an 
upgrade or downgrade of an actual rating or 
outlook.
They find that both rating and outlook changes 
significantly affect bond and stock markets, 
with yield spreads increasing and stock returns 
declining in response to a downgrade. Rating 
changes also contribute to contagion or spillo-
ver effects, with rating changes of bonds of one 
emerging market triggering changes in both 
yield spreads and stock returns of other emer-
ging economies. Lastly, their results suggest 
that rating agencies act pro-cyclically, down-
grading countries in bad times and upgrading 
them in good times. In this sense, rating agen-
cies might add instability to financial markets 
in emerging economies. 
Kräussl (2003) also examines cross-security 
and cross-country contagious rating effects. His 
empirical study focuses on the following trans-
mission mechanism of financial contagion in 
emerging market crises, i.e. a financial crisis in 
one country can worsen market participants’ 
perception of the economic conditions and 
prospects in other countries with similar charac-
teristics, and as a consequence set off a wide-
spread fall in international investors’ sentiment. 
Therefore, country-specific events such as a 
negative Sovereign credit rating announcement 
may be perceived as a “wake-up call” leading 
to a general reevaluation of investment condi-
tions and prospects in the whole region, thereby 
inducing institutional investors to rebalance 
their portfolios. He analyzes the specific impact 
of Sovereign rating changes during the financial 
turmoil in emerging markets in the latter half of 
the 1990s and finds that Sovereign rating 
changes in a ground-zero country have a 
(statistically) significant impact on the financial 
A LONG-RUN PERFORMANCE OF SOVEREIGN RATING CHANGES : 219 
220 : CADERNOS DO MERCADO DE VALORES MOBILIÁRIOS
markets of other emerging market economies 
although the spillover effects tend to be re-
gional.
Gande and Parsley (2002) examine the nature 
of cross-border financial market linkages. They 
focus on the transmission of news concerning 
Sovereign credit ratings, to Sovereign bonds 
issued by other countries. In particular, they 
concentrate on the spillover of a change in the 
Sovereign debt rating or the credit outlook of 
one country, to interest rate spreads on Sove-
reign debt for other countries. They find evi-
dence of asymmetric spillover effects, i.e., posi-
tive ratings events abroad have no discernable 
impact on Sovereign spreads, whereas negative 
ratings events abroad are associated with an 
increase in spreads.  
This paper contributes to the literature on Sov-
ereign ratings by examining both the short and 
long-run effects of rating changes on own coun-
try aggregate stock and bond markets. We 
measure the aggregate stock and bond market 
impact of Sovereign rating changes using an 
event study methodology. We examine the evo-
lution of stock market spreads (domestic stock 
market returns relative to a benchmark) and 
bond market spreads (Sovereign bond yield 
spreads relative to a benchmark) following an 
upgrade or downgrade of an actual Sovereign 
rating. We include rating changes for both 
emerging and developed countries, which al-
lows us to study the possibility of different im-
pact across countries based on their degree of 
economic development.  
Event studies can also provide evidence on 
whether rating agencies act pro-cyclically, 
downgrading countries during bad times and 
upgrading them during good times. Event     
studies can also bring to the forefront whether 
the actions of rating agencies have sustained or 
merely transitory effects on financial markets 
and if these effects are likely to be stronger in 
emerging markets, where problems of asymme-
tric information and transparency are more 
severe.
Our findings should be of great interest to 
investors and particularly managed investment 
funds, who are increasingly focused on interna-
tional diversification, since a change in Sove-
reign ratings is a key event regarding the asset 
allocation decision. 
Our main results can be summarized as follows. 
First, we find that rating downgrades have a 
significantly negative impact on own national 
aggregate financial markets, especially in emer-
ging markets. Rating changes significantly 
affect emerging countries’ bond and stock mar-
kets, with bond yield spreads increasing and 
stock returns declining considerably in response 
to a downgrade. The short-run impact of rating 
changes in developed countries is restricted to 
bond markets. Thus, while the negative effect 
of sovereign debt rating downgrades does spill 
over to other assets markets in emerging coun-
tries, this is not the case in developed markets. 
Second, in contrast to downgrades, rating 
upgrades do not have a significant impact on 
financial markets’ subsequent returns. Conse-
quently, our findings largely echo those already 
documented that upgrades do not have a great 
wealth impact, while downgrades have signifi-
cant impact. 
Third, we find that, as expected, rating changes 
affect emerging countries more strongly than 
developed ones, as these changes reveal more 
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information about emerging countries. This 
result is novel in the literature and contrasts 
with the findings in Brooks et al. (2002) where 
there is no significant difference between the 
impact in developed and emerging countries. 
The conflicting results can be explained by a 
different sample period and methodology. 
Fourth, we study the performance of rating 
changes over several event windows up to two-
year after the rating announcement. This is the 
first study of the long-run impact of Sovereign 
rating changes for horizons greater than one-
month. We find that the negative wealth impact 
of a Sovereign rating downgrade persists up to 
six months after the rating downgrade both in 
the aggregate stock and bond markets. 
Finally, we add to the existent evidence on the 
role of rating agencies during financial crises, 
as we find that Sovereign rating downgrades 
occur after market downturns supporting that 
rating agencies have a pro-cyclical behavior 
and, consequently, may contribute to additional 
financial instability. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as fol-
lows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 
presents the methodology used in our analysis. 
Section 4 presents the empirical. Section 5 con-
cludes.
2. DATA DESCRIPTION
The data set consists of stock and bond spreads 
of the developed and emerging markets. The 
emerging markets used in our study are Poland, 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria, Turkey, 
Russia, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Peru, Philip-
pines, Venezuela, Chile, Colombia, South 
Korea, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Taiwan, 
Israel and South Africa. The developed markets 
are Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece, France, Bel-
gium, The Netherlands, Germany, Austria, Ire-
land, Finland, Canada, Denmark, New Zealand, 
Sweden, United Kingdom, Australia, Japan, 
Norway and Switzerland. 
Aggregate stock prices of both developed and 
emerging markets are collected from Datas-
tream. Stock market price indexes for each 
country are measured in U.S. dollars. The U.S. 
stock index is used as the benchmark over 
which we calculate the spreads. 
Bond market spreads for the developed markets 
are calculated using the ten-year government 
bond zero coupon rates, collected from 
Bloomberg. We use zero coupon rates rather 
than bond yields as they control for different 
durations caused by different bond cash-flow 
structures. We focus on the ten-year yields be-
cause their liquidity is usually higher than that 
of other maturities. We use the U.S. Treasuries 
as the benchmark, reflecting not only the higher 
liquidity of the U.S. government bond market, 
but also the perceived reduced risk of U.S. gov-
ernment bonds relative to the bonds of other 
countries.
We use Sovereign stripped spreads obtained 
from JP Morgan for the emerging markets. In 
particular, the yield spread index for each 
country is given by the Emerging Market Bond 
Indices (EMBI), the EMBI+ or the EMBI Glo-
bal, according to their availability. 
The EMBI track most traded external-currency-
denominated debt instruments in the emerging 
markets and offer one of the longest and most 
comprehensive emerging market spread series. 
There are some differences between each of 
these indices. The EMBI tracks total returns for 
U.S. dollar-denominated Brady and Brady-style 
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bonds. The EMBI+ tracks total returns for U.S. 
dollar-denominated Brady bonds, loans, Euro-
bonds, and U.S. dollar-denominated local mar-
kets instruments. Alternatively, EMBI Global 
tracks total returns for U.S. dollar-denominated 
Brady Bonds, Eurobonds, traded loans, and 
local market debt instruments issued by Sove-
reign and quasi-Sovereign entities1.
We investigate the own-country impact of 
Sovereign rating changes on the stock and bond 
market return of countries using the population 
of all rating change announcements for the 
period January 1, 1990 through June 6, 2003 by 
three specialized rating agencies, namely, Stan-
dard & Poors, Moodys and Fitch. Table 1 dis-
plays the series availability for each country 
and their time coverage. Table 2 reports the 
time span of rating change events included in 
the sample for each country and by rating 
agency2.
1- The EMBI indices have several features that are useful for our analysis. They control for floating coupons, unusual features, and principal collateral and 
rolling interest guarantees. All instruments included in the indices must have a minimum $500 face value and satisfy a liquidity criteria. Thus, the spreads used 
in our analysis have similar liquidity. All bonds included in the index have a remaining maturity greater than 2.5 years and average maturity of country indices 
is comparable.  
2- Standard & Poors generated the first set of ratings in 1961 and has been a major force in Sovereign ratings since that time. Moody’s began rating the credit-
worthiness of countries in 1974. Fitch entered the market considerably later in 1994. Each agency has a similar coverage of countries and all are relatively 
active in assessing Sovereign rating.  
Table 1- Bond and Stock Market Data Availability 
This table displays the availability of stock market index returns and bond yields and spreads for each country 
and their time coverage. 
Stock Index 10 year EMBI Spreads EMBI+ Spreads EMBIG Spreads
(USD) zero coupon
rate
Initial date End date Initial date End date Initial date End date Initial date End date Initial date End date
Emerging Countries
Poland 01-03-1994 31-12-2002 30-11-1994 28-06-2002 31-12-1997 06-06-2003 31-12-1997 06-06-2003
Czech Republic 09-11-1993 31-12-2002
Hungary 21-06-1991 31-12-2002 29-01-1999 06-06-2003
Bulgaria 30-11-1994 28-06-2002 31-12-1997 06-06-2003 31-12-1997 06-06-2003
Turkey 01-01-1990 31-12-2002 31-12-1997 06-06-2003 31-12-1997 06-06-2003
Russia 20-06-1994 31-12-2002 04-01-1999 28-06-2002 31-12-1997 06-06-2003 31-12-1997 06-06-2003
Brazil 04-07-1994 31-12-2002 31-12-1991 28-06-2002 31-12-1997 06-06-2003 31-12-1997 06-06-2003
Argentina 01-01-1990 31-12-2002 30-04-1993 28-06-2002 31-12-1997 06-06-2003 31-12-1997 06-06-2003
Mexico 01-01-1990 31-12-2002 31-12-1991 28-06-2002 31-12-1997 06-06-2003 31-12-1997 06-06-2003
Peru 03-01-1994 31-12-2002 30-05-1997 28-06-2002 31-12-1997 06-06-2003 31-12-1997 06-06-2003
Philippines 01-01-1990 31-12-2002 31-12-1991 30-01-1997 31-12-1997 06-06-2003 31-12-1997 06-06-2003
Venezuela 02-01-1990 31-12-2002 31-12-1991 28-06-2002 04-01-1999 06-06-2003 31-12-1997 06-06-2003
Chile 01-01-1990 31-12-2002 01-06-1999 06-06-2003
Colombia 10-03-1992 31-12-2002 31-12-1997 06-06-2003
South Korea 01-01-1990 31-12-2002 30-04-1998 06-06-2003 31-12-1997 06-06-2003
China 26-07-1993 31-12-2002 31-12-1997 06-06-2003
Indonesia 02-04-1990 31-12-2002
Malaysia 01-01-1990 31-12-2002 31-12-1997 06-06-2003
Taiwan 01-01-1990 31-12-2002
Israel 01-01-1993 31-12-2002
South Africa 01-01-1990 31-12-2002 31-12-1997 06-06-2003
Developed Countries
Portugal 02-01-1990 31-12-2002 11-12-1994 31-12-2002
Spain 01-01-1990 31-12-2002 09-06-1993 31-12-2002
Italy 01-01-1990 31-12-2002 28-04-1997 31-12-2002
Greece 01-01-1990 31-12-2002 10-01-2001 31-12-2002
Belgium 01-01-1990 31-12-2002 11-12-1994 31-12-2002
Ireland 01-01-1990 31-12-2002 27-02-1994 31-12-2002
Finland 01-01-1990 31-12-2002 07-09-1998 31-12-2002
Canada 01-01-1990 31-12-2002 20-06-1997 31-12-2002
Japan 01-01-1990 31-12-2002 16-04-1991 31-12-2002
Benchmark
United States 01-01-1990 31-12-2002 16-04-1991 31-12-2002
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Table 2- Rating Changes Data Availability 
This table displays the rating series availability for each country and their time coverage. Initial date is the 
date of the first change included in the sample. End date is the date of the last changes included in the       
sample. 
Sovereign Ratings Sovereign Ratings
Local currency LT Debt Foreign currency LT Debt
Moody's Standard & Poors Fitch Moody's Standard & Poors Fitch
Initial date End date Initial date End date Initial date End date Initial date End date Initial date End date Initial date End date
Emerging Countries
Poland 01-06-1995 12-11-2002 01-06-1995 15-05-2000 26-10-1995 19-11-1998
Czech Republic 22-06-1998 12-11-2002 18-07-1994 05-11-1998 10-08-1995 24-11-1997
Hungary 27-12-1993 12-11-2002 20-04-1992 19-12-2000 25-04-1996 29-11-2000
Bulgaria 27-09-1996 19-12-2001 23-11-1998 07-11-2001 17-04-1998 17-04-1998
Turkey 05-05-1992 21-12-2000 28-04-1994 27-04-2001 10-08-1994 25-03-2003
Russia 22-11-1996 17-12-2002 07-10-1996 05-12-2002 07-10-1996 13-05-2003
Brazil 30-11-1994 12-08-2002 30-11-1994 07-02-2002 01-12-1994 21-10-2002
Argentina 15-08-1990 20-12-2001 25-08-1993 06-11-2001 28-05-1997 03-12-2001
Mexico 20-02-1991 06-02-2002 29-07-1992 07-02-2002 30-08-1995 15-01-2002
Peru 05-01-1996 27-03-1998 18-12-1997 01-11-2000 14-10-1999 18-04-2001
Philippines 09-04-1998 09-04-1998 30-06-1993 21-02-1997 08-07-1999 15-03-2001
Venezuela 07-08-1991 20-09-2002 09-02-1990 13-12-2002 15-09-1997 28-06-2002
Chile 29-06-1995 29-06-1995 07-12-1992 11-07-1995 10-11-1994 30-08-1995
Colombia 11-08-1995 11-08-1999 21-06-1993 24-05-2000 19-05-2000 10-01-2002
South Korea 09-04-1998 28-03-2002 03-05-1995 24-07-2002 27-06-1996 27-06-2002
China 10-09-1993 03-12-1998 14-05-1997 21-07-1999 11-12-1997 11-12-1997
Indonesia 21-12-1997 19-03-1998 07-12-1992 05-09-2002 04-06-1997 01-08-2002
Malaysia 12-03-1990 25-09-2002 13-09-1990 20-08-2002 13-08-1998 07-08-2002
Taiwan 07-12-1992 18-12-2002 20-11-2001 20-11-2001
Israel 12-12-1995 06-07-2000 19-01-1993 09-12-1995 24-11-1995 22-10-2001
South Africa 03-10-1994 29-11-2001 03-10-1994 07-05-2003 22-09-1994 02-05-2003
Developed Countries
Portugal 06-05-1998 15-12-1998 14-07-1998 14-07-1998
Spain 31-01-1997 13-12-2001 06-05-1998 31-03-1999 14-07-1998 01-09-1999
Italy 23-11-1993 15-07-2002 06-05-1998 06-05-1998 14-07-1998 17-06-2002
Greece 28-01-1997 04-11-2002 26-03-1997 13-03-2001 25-10-1999 20-06-2001
Belgium 27-01-1997 27-01-1997 06-05-1998 06-05-1998 14-07-1998 17-06-2002
Ireland 04-09-1992 13-02-1997 06-05-1998 03-10-2001 14-07-1998 16-12-1998
Finland 15-01-1997 15-01-1997 06-05-1998 02-01-2002 14-07-1998 11-11-1999
Canada 03-05-1993 12-04-1995 04-10-1992 04-10-1992 26-10-1995 26-10-1995
Japan 03-05-1993 31-05-2002 17-03-1995 15-04-2002 26-10-1995 21-11-2002
A credit rating represents an assessment of the 
overall creditworthiness of an obligor in terms 
of both its capacity and willingness to meet its 
financial commitments as they fall due. Sove-
reign credit risk analysis may be divided into 
two broad components, specifically economic 
and political risk. Economic risk deals with the 
government’s ability to repay its obligations on 
time and is a function of both qualitative and 
quantitative factors, while political risk addres-
ses the Sovereign’s willingness to repay its 
outstanding debt on time. Accordingly, rating 
agencies provide an evaluation of a country’s 
creditworthiness and convey a rating to that 
country. Governments generally seek credit 
ratings to ease their own access (and the access 
of other issuers domiciled within their borders) 
to international capital markets, where many 
investors, particularly U.S. investors, prefer 
rated securities over unrated securities of appa-
rently similar credit risk. Although the indivi-
dual agencies’ ratings are measured on different 
scales, there are very broad similarities between 
them. Table 3 presents the rating scales used by 
each rating agency in addition to a consolidated 
rating, which allows a comparison of individual 
agency ratings. 
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Table 4 presents a summary of rating agency 
activity over the period of analysis. For the 
emerging countries we use the long-term 
foreign currency ratings and for the developed 
countries we use long-term local currency 
ratings. There are no rating changes for France, 
The Netherlands, Germany, Austria, Denmark, 
New Zealand, Sweden, United Kingdom, Aus-
tralia, Norway and Switzerland during the sam-
ple period, consequently these countries are not 
included in the analysis.  
Our sample only includes rating upgrades 
(downgrades) that did not have a subsequent 
upgrade (downgrade) in the 20 days following 
the initial change. This prevents events that 
occur shortly after the initial event influencing 
our results. There are 182 events between 
January 1, 1990 and June 6, 2003. Table 4 splits 
the events in developed and emerging countries. 
As expected, there are much more rating chan-
ges in emerging countries (156 events) than in 
developed countries (26 events). Table 4 also 
splits the sample into upgrades and downgra-
des. There are more positive events (110) than 
negative events (76). In particular, in the case 
of emerging countries there are 94 upgrades and 
62 downgrades. 
Table 5 analyzes whether a rating change is 
usually followed by another rating change in a 
twelve-month period after the initial event. We 
find that for emerging market downgrades, the-
re is a subsequent downgrade less than twelve 
months after the initial event in 56% of the 
cases. In the case of emerging markets upgrade, 
the percentage of subsequent upgrades in a 
twelve-month period is slightly smaller (49%). 
3. METHODOLOGY
We study the dynamic response of financial 
markets following a rating change using an 
event study methodology. Event studies can 
show whether the actions of rating agencies 
have sustained or merely transitory effects       
on financial markets. Event studies can also 
Table 3- Comparison of Rating Agencies’ Credit Rating Measures
This table summarizes the credit rating measures applied by three leading agencies: Standard & Poors (S&P), 
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provide evidence on whether rating agencies act 
pro-cyclically, downgrading countries during 
bad times and upgrading them during good 
times.
Following Kaminski and Schmukler (2002), we 
examine the impact of rating changes on stock 
market spreads (domestic stock markets return 
relative to a benchmark) and bond market 
spreads (Sovereign bond yield spreads relative 
to a benchmark) over different horizons around 
an upgrade or downgrade of an actual rating. 
Brooks et al. (2002) study the impact of rating 
changes in stock market returns using abnormal 
returns derived from the market model. Later, 
we test the robustness of our stock market 
results also using abnormal returns calculated 
using the market model.3
Stock market spreads are calculated using U.S. 
dollar denominated domestic stock returns rela-
tive to the U.S. stock market return 
(benchmark). Daily stock market spreads 
(abnormal returns) for each event in each 
country are calculated as follows: 
(1)
where Ri,t is the geometric U.S. dollar return on 
stock index of country i on day t and RUS,t is the 
corresponding geometric return of the U.S. 
stock market index.  
Table 4- Number of Upgrades and Downgrades by Rating Agency and Country
This table displays the number of changes in ratings of long-term sovereign debt. The sample excludes      
subsequent rating changes that occur on the twenty days after the previous rating change. 
Country Total Ratings
Changes Upgrades Downgrades
Poland 6 6 0
Czech Republic 4 2 2
Hungary 10 10 0
Bulgaria 5 5 0
Turkey 10 2 8
Russia 13 7 6
Brazil 10 8 2
Argentina 11 3 8
Mexico 5 5 0
Peru 4 1 3
Philippines 2 2 0
Venezuela 13 2 11
Chile 3 3 0
Colombia 4 1 3
South Korea 14 11 3
China 3 2 1
Indonesia 15 5 10
Malaysia 14 10 4
Taiwan 1 0 1
Israel 4 4 0
South Africa 5 5 0
Sub-total 156 94 62
Portugal 2 2 0
Spain 3 3 0
Italy 2 2 0
Greece 3 3 0
Belgium 2 1 1
Ireland 2 2 0
Finland 3 3 0
Canada 1 0 1
Japan 8 0 8
Sub-total 26 16 10
Total 182 110 72
tUStiti RRAR ,,,
3- The market model allows us to calculate risk-adjusted abnormal returns, which could be of interest especially in emerging countries. However, using the 
market model requires prior estimation of two parameters for each event/country. There is extensive literature that shows there is considerable 
estimation error associated with estimating betas.
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 Bond market spreads for developed countries 
are given by the difference between the 10-year 
zero coupon bond U.S. dollar rate of return of 
local government debt of each country relati-
vely to the U.S. Treasuries 10-year zero coupon 
bond rate of return. Daily market bond spreads 
(abnormal returns) for each event in each deve-
loped country are given by: 
(2)
where Yi,t is the 10-year zero coupon bond yield 
on market i on day t in local currency, YUS,t is 
the corresponding 10-year zero coupon yield on 
the U.S. government bond market on day t, and 
Si/US,t is the exchange rate of one unit of country 
i currency for U.S. dollars on day t.
For emerging markets we use the EMBI, which 
are calculated using U.S. Dollar denominated 
debt and the U.S. Treasuries as benchmark. 
Daily market bond spreads are then calculated 
in the following way: 
   
 (3) 
where Spreadi,t is the difference between 
country i government debt yields (U.S. dollar-
denominated) and U.S. government debt yields 
on day t. Notice that given the negative relation 
between bond yields and prices, a positive 
(negative) abnormal return represents a negati-
ve (positive) rate of return. 
Table 5- Number of Subsequent Upgrades and Downgrades in a One-year Horizon
The table displays the number of changes in ratings of long-term sovereign debt that occur less than one year 
after the previous rating change of the same sign. The sample excludes subsequent rating changes that occur 
















Colom bia 0 1
South Korea 8 2
China 0 0
Indonesia 1 7
M alaysia 4 3
Taiwan 0 0
Israel 1 0
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In order to capture the effect of an upgrade or 
downgrade on the evolution of spreads around 
the time of the event and in the long-run we use 
five different time horizon windows. Each of 
these windows starts on the tenth day prior to 
the event and ends, respectively, one-, three-, 
six-, twelve-, and twenty-four months after the 
event.
Of course, other factors which also affect the 
evolution of spreads might take place at the 
same time. We do not control for those factors 
and we assume that on average there is no parti-
cular bias in the event studies. We expect that 
those other factors influence spreads both posi-
tively and negatively in a random way.  
We use rating changes by the three rating agen-
cies (Moody’s, S&P and Fitch) indifferently. 
To prevent events by the same agency (or by a 
different agency) that occur shortly before the 
event we are analyzing) from influencing the 
cumulative returns in the windows, for our 
study we take into account only the first upgra-
de or downgrade that occurs within a window 
of 20 days. 
The impact of rating changes is analyzed 
using cumulative abnormal return (CAR), which 
is given by the sum of the daily abnormal 
returns on each event window, i.e., 
   
   (4) 
where t1 is the first day of the event window 
and t2 is the last day of the event window. 
We analyze the impact of rating announcements 
by taking the average of the AR and CAR across 
events:
    
   (5) 
   
   (6) 
where       is the average abnormal returns of the 
events on day t,     is the average cumulative 
abnormal returns of the events on day t, and N
is the number of events.  
The statistical significance of the average AR
and CAR is assessed following Boehmer, 
Musumeci and Poulsen (1991). The t-statistic is 
calculated by dividing the average event-period 
abnormal return by its contemporaneous cross-
sectional standard error. This cross sectional 
estimate of the standard deviation is the valid 
event when there is an event-induced change in 
the volatility. The estimated variances are esti-
mated as follows: 
(7)
 (8) 
where          is the variance of the average 
abnormal   returns   of   the  events on day t and               
                     is the variance of the average 
cumulative abnormal returns of the events on 
day t.
The t-statistics for the average AR and CAR are 
given respectively by: 
 (9) 
(10)
which are asymptotically normally distributed 
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4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
This section presents both the short- and long-
run impact of credit rating changes on the 
aggregate stock and bond markets in emerging 
and developed countries. To capture whether 
these changes persistently affect the investors’ 
mood, we rely on an event-study methodology. 
We examine the long-run performance of asset 
markets around the time of rating changes using 
several different horizons: one-, three, six-, 
twelve-, and twenty-four months after the 
event. If there is more than one event within a 
20-day window, we look only at the one that 
occurred first.
The maximum number of rating changes in the 
emerging markets (long-term foreign currency 
denominated debt ratings) examined is 156 (94 
upgrades and 62 downgrades) as shown in 
Table 4. For the developed countries (long-term 
local currency debt rating changes), the number 
of rating changes is 26 (16 upgrades and 10 
downgrades).
Standard event-study methodology requires 
linking rating events to abnormal returns. We 
consider the spreads between the instruments of 
each country and the benchmark instruments of 
the reference country (U.S. for both the emer-
ging and the developed markets). For stock 
markets, we use the difference between each 
country stock market index return (calculated in 
U.S. dollars) and the U.S. stock market index 
returns. For emerging bond markets, we use de 
EMBI index spreads, which are measured rela-
tive to the U.S. Treasuries.  For the developed 
bond markets, we use the spread between the 
rates of return of 10-year zero coupon bonds 
(calculated in U.S. dollars). 
4.1. Short-Run Performance 
Tables 6 displays the short-run stock market 
reaction to Sovereign rating changes using an 
event window that starts ten days before the 
event and ends ten days after the event.  Table 6 
reports both daily abnormal returns and cumu-
lative abnormal returns calculated as the diffe-
rence between each stock market returns and 
the U.S. stock market daily returns. Table 7 
presents similar results for the bond market 
reaction to changes in ratings. Panel A shows 
the emerging markets’ impact while Panel B 
refers to the impact in developed markets. 
Panel A of Table 6 shows that rating downgra-
des have a significant short-run wealth effect in 
the emerging stock markets. Average cumulati-
ve abnormal returns show a strong negative 
value in the days leading up to the rating chan-
ge and also after the rating change. Average 
CARs are significant at the 5% significance 
level from eight days before the event up to ten 
days after the event. Specifically, average 
abnormal returns show significant decreases 
prior to the rating change on days -10, -8, -7 
and -6, suggesting that information on rating 
downgrades or information on which rating 
agencies base their rating decisions is public 
and has an impact in the market a few days 
before the event happens. On the day just after 
the rating change (day 1) average ARs is also 
significant, denoting the presence of some pri-
vate information available only to ratings agen-
cies that has, as a consequence of the rating 
change, come into the public domain. 
In contrast, emerging countries’ rating upgrades 
have no significant short-run impact in the 
country’s stock market. Stock market return 
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Table 6 
Short-Run Stock Market Reaction to Rating Changes
This table reports average abnormal returns (AR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) as measures of stock 
market short-run reaction to rating changes. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively. N is the number of available events. 
Panel A - Emerging Stock Markets
Event Upgrades Downgrades
Day AR t-stat CAR t-stat AR t-stat CAR t-stat
-10 -0.0025 -0.7866 -0.0025 -0.7866 -0.0077 -1.7770 * -0.0077 -1.7770 *
-9 -0.0009 -0.3276 -0.0034 -0.8105 -0.0073 -1.0486 -0.0151 -1.8305 *
-8 -0.0042 -1.5562 -0.0076 -1.5215 -0.0074 -1.7321 * -0.0224 -2.4216 **
-7 0.0002 0.0691 -0.0074 -1.2872 -0.0107 -2.1892 ** -0.0332 -3.1646 ***
-6 -0.0049 -1.7592 * -0.0122 -1.9240 * -0.0122 -2.1087 ** -0.0454 -3.7896 ***
-5 0.0032 0.9681 -0.0091 -1.2710 0.0021 0.3598 -0.0433 -3.2365 ***
-4 -0.0007 -0.2539 -0.0098 -1.2771 -0.0090 -1.5652 -0.0523 -3.5917 ***
-3 0.0029 1.3453 -0.0068 -0.8584 0.0045 0.9040 -0.0478 -3.1056 ***
-2 0.0020 1.0422 -0.0048 -0.5879 -0.0077 -1.1389 -0.0555 -3.3010 ***
-1 0.0008 0.2367 -0.0041 -0.4626 -0.0101 -1.4410 -0.0656 -3.6013 ***
0 -0.0008 -0.3636 -0.0049 -0.5378 -0.0036 -0.6882 -0.0692 -3.6515 ***
1 -0.0018 -0.5696 -0.0066 -0.6928 -0.0170 -3.0088 *** -0.0862 -4.3597 ***
2 -0.0008 -0.4289 -0.0074 -0.7611 -0.0077 -1.3679 -0.0939 -4.5675 ***
3 -0.0040 -1.9109 * -0.0115 -1.1479 0.0090 1.4692 -0.0849 -3.9598 ***
4 0.0020 0.5325 -0.0095 -0.8876 0.0013 0.2301 -0.0836 -3.7737 ***
5 -0.0010 -0.4157 -0.0105 -0.9567 -0.0069 -1.3028 -0.0906 -3.9735 ***
6 -0.0009 -0.3354 -0.0114 -1.0094 0.0057 1.5625 -0.0849 -3.6780 ***
7 -0.0005 -0.2023 -0.0118 -1.0295 -0.0052 -1.1729 -0.0901 -3.8339 ***
8 0.0014 0.6310 -0.0104 -0.8884 -0.0077 -1.3427 -0.0978 -4.0426 ***
9 -0.0002 -0.1224 -0.0106 -0.8968 -0.0084 -1.6129 -0.1062 -4.2917 ***
10 -0.0012 -0.5273 -0.0118 -0.9824 -0.0016 -0.2974 -0.1078 -4.2595 ***
N = 89 N = 62
Panel B - Developed Stock Markets
Event Upgrades Downgrades
Day AR t-stat CAR t-stat AR t-stat CAR t-stat
-10 -0.0041 -1.0793 -0.0041 -1.0793 -0.0015 -0.3232 -0.0015 -0.3232
-9 0.0002 0.0422 -0.0039 -0.6750 0.0098 1.7109 * 0.0083 1.1095
-8 0.0004 0.1154 -0.0035 -0.5089 0.0006 0.1023 0.0088 0.9485
-7 -0.0077 -1.6937 * -0.0112 -1.3654 0.0014 0.2592 0.0102 0.9518
-6 0.0024 1.0482 -0.0088 -1.0267 -0.0008 -0.1700 0.0095 0.8131
-5 0.0039 1.3218 -0.0049 -0.5398 0.0036 1.0246 0.0131 1.0773
-4 0.0047 1.2197 -0.0001 -0.0132 0.0042 1.0495 0.0173 1.3495
-3 0.0057 1.4086 0.0056 0.5247 -0.0071 -1.6506 * 0.0101 0.7497
-2 0.0025 0.7508 0.0081 0.7247 0.0127 3.4572 *** 0.0228 1.6310
-1 0.0022 0.5224 0.0103 0.8629 -0.0019 -0.4424 0.0209 1.4282
0 -0.0052 -1.0057 0.0051 0.3894 0.0068 1.6303 0.0277 1.8196 *
1 -0.0023 -0.5125 0.0027 0.1982 0.0007 0.1246 0.0284 1.7536 *
2 0.0042 0.9243 0.0069 0.4762 -0.0016 -0.5244 0.0268 1.6258
3 -0.0054 -1.6297 0.0015 0.0995 -0.0008 -0.2314 0.0260 1.5486
4 -0.0038 -0.5494 -0.0023 -0.1425 -0.0017 -0.4265 0.0244 1.4121
5 0.0045 0.9649 0.0022 0.1298 -0.0009 -0.1360 0.0235 1.2690
6 -0.0051 -1.3515 -0.0029 -0.1648 -0.0075 -1.5675 0.0160 0.8366
7 -0.0003 -0.0768 -0.0032 -0.1776 0.0021 0.6352 0.0180 0.9308
8 -0.0029 -0.6552 -0.0061 -0.3285 0.0045 1.0747 0.0225 1.1359
9 -0.0026 -1.0067 -0.0087 -0.4671 -0.0045 -1.1919 0.0180 0.8932
10 0.0066 1.3799 -0.0021 -0.1102 -0.0091 -1.7546 * 0.0089 0.4282
N = 13 N = 9
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Table 7 
Short-Run Bond Market Reaction to Rating Changes 
This table reports average abnormal returns (AR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) as measures of 
bond market short-run reaction to rating changes. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% 
and 1% level, respectively. N is the number of available events. 
Panel A - Emerging Bond Markets
Event Upgrades Downgrades
Day AR t-stat CAR t-stat AR t-stat CAR t-stat
-10 -0.0001 -0.0310 -0.0001 -0.0310 0.0131 1.0379 0.0131 1.0379
-9 0.0012 0.1999 0.0010 0.1445 0.0097 1.5625 0.0228 1.6219
-8 -0.0029 -0.6296 -0.0019 -0.2214 0.0102 1.4808 0.0330 2.1093 **
-7 -0.0029 -0.6220 -0.0048 -0.4956 -0.0064 -1.0878 0.0266 1.5873
-6 -0.0070 -1.2962 -0.0118 -1.0602 0.0120 1.6933 * 0.0385 2.1215 **
-5 -0.0022 -0.6205 -0.0140 -1.1996 0.0227 2.3183 ** 0.0613 2.9683 ***
-4 -0.0010 -0.2050 -0.0150 -1.1895 0.0221 3.1852 *** 0.0834 3.8278 ***
-3 0.0098 2.4518 ** -0.0052 -0.3905 0.0217 3.3846 *** 0.1050 4.6266 ***
-2 0.0052 0.8029 0.0000 0.0012 0.0007 0.0871 0.1058 4.3619 ***
-1 -0.0056 -1.2654 -0.0056 -0.3621 0.0067 0.7441 0.1125 4.3475 ***
0 -0.0264 -3.0897 *** -0.0320 -1.8171 * 0.0154 1.6396 0.1279 4.6460 ***
1 0.0059 1.0427 -0.0261 -1.4100 0.0046 0.4644 0.1325 4.5279 ***
2 -0.0018 -0.3789 -0.0279 -1.4600 0.0114 1.5337 0.1439 4.7663 ***
3 0.0051 1.0008 -0.0228 -1.1543 0.0085 1.2596 0.1524 4.9264 ***
4 -0.0119 -2.4365 ** -0.0347 -1.7063 * 0.0043 0.4574 0.1567 4.8492 ***
5 0.0005 0.1227 -0.0343 -1.6515 * -0.0095 -1.1497 0.1472 4.4146 ***
6 -0.0040 -0.6215 -0.0382 -1.7611 * 0.0027 0.4646 0.1499 4.4294 ***
7 0.0068 0.5872 -0.0314 -1.2750 -0.0001 -0.0120 0.1498 4.2912 ***
8 -0.0015 -0.3047 -0.0329 -1.3099 0.0091 1.0435 0.1589 4.4162 ***
9 -0.0082 -1.0108 -0.0410 -1.5571 0.0062 0.7282 0.1651 4.4651 ***
10 0.0115 1.3242 -0.0296 -1.0662 -0.0047 -0.6834 0.1604 4.2628 ***
N = 66 N = 41
Panel B - Developed Bond Markets
Event Upgrades Downgrades
Day AR t-stat CAR t-stat AR t-stat CAR t-stat
-10 -0.0025 -0.5140 -0.0025 -0.5140 0.0075 1.0333 0.0075 1.0333
-9 -0.0045 -1.6366 -0.0070 -1.2596 0.0318 3.8518 *** 0.0393 3.5796 ***
-8 -0.0018 -0.7729 -0.0088 -1.4607 -0.0228 -5.1881 *** 0.0165 1.3965
-7 0.0039 0.7801 -0.0049 -0.6266 -0.0351 -5.3312 *** -0.0186 -1.3774
-6 0.0007 0.2461 -0.0042 -0.5072 0.0265 3.0333 *** 0.0079 0.4881
-5 -0.0031 -1.2887 -0.0074 -0.8490 -0.0163 -2.1272 ** -0.0084 -0.4732
-4 0.0046 1.1444 -0.0028 -0.2874 0.0291 2.8045 *** 0.0207 1.0037
-3 -0.0005 -0.1237 -0.0033 -0.3128 -0.0248 -2.6853 *** -0.0041 -0.1829
-2 -0.0034 -1.3946 -0.0066 -0.6209 -0.0024 -0.3905 -0.0065 -0.2772
-1 -0.0013 -0.4074 -0.0079 -0.7107 0.0010 0.1531 -0.0055 -0.2254
0 -0.0081 -2.0950 ** -0.0160 -1.3586 0.0267 3.0704 *** 0.0212 0.8214
1 -0.0003 -0.0704 -0.0163 -1.3176 -0.0130 -2.5985 ** 0.0083 0.3139
2 0.0073 2.5461 ** -0.0090 -0.7076 -0.0036 -0.6514 0.0047 0.1743
3 -0.0033 -1.2154 -0.0122 -0.9441 0.0376 3.4065 *** 0.0423 1.4565
4 -0.0019 -0.6781 -0.0141 -1.0660 -0.0005 -0.1015 0.0418 1.4224
5 0.0009 0.2280 -0.0132 -0.9499 0.0028 0.3494 0.0446 1.4642
6 0.0024 0.7463 -0.0108 -0.7588 0.0207 3.3583 *** 0.0654 2.1020 **
7 -0.0009 -0.2480 -0.0117 -0.7960 0.0375 3.7748 *** 0.1028 3.1501 ***
8 -0.0017 -0.4110 -0.0134 -0.8787 0.0149 3.1318 *** 0.1177 3.5689 ***
9 0.0013 0.5080 -0.0121 -0.7837 0.0143 1.7261 * 0.1320 3.8818 ***
10 0.0031 0.8886 -0.0090 -0.5690 0.0214 2.6538 *** 0.1534 4.3886 ***
N = 16 N = 9
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spreads relative to the U.S. stock market index 
are not statistically significantly around the 
announcement date. Panel B of Table 6 shows 
that for developed countries, average abnormal 
returns are not statistically significant following 
both rating upgrades and downgrades. 
Table 7 reports similar findings in aggregate 
bond markets. Downgrades have a significant 
negative return effect (recall that the table 
reports a positive impact in yields) in emerging 
markets’ bond average CARs, from six days 
before the event up to ten days after the event. 
Significant increases in average ARs from day 
–6 to –3 can be observed. Panel B shows that 
rating downgrades also have some negative 
impact in developed markets, with significant 
average ARs on some days before and after the 
event. Average CARs are significant at the 5% 
significance level on day –9 and after the event, 
from day 6 to 10. 
Conversely, there is weak evidence that rating 
upgrades have an impact on either emerging or 
developed bond markets, even though there are 
significant ARs in the emerging markets in the 
day of the upgrade, as well as on day 4 after the 
event. In developed markets ARs are only sig-
nificant on day of the event announcement and 
on day 2 after the event. CARs are not signifi-
cant at the conventional significance level in 
either emerging or developed markets following 
rating upgrades. 
Overall, we find that rating downgrades have a 
significant negative impact on the performance 
of the country’s stock and bond markets relative 
to the U.S. market, especially in emerging 
countries. The impact on developed markets is 
smaller and significant only in the government 
bond markets. While the negative effect of 
sovereign rating downgrade in the bond market 
does spill over to other assets markets in emer-
ging countries, this does not seem to be the case 
in developed markets.  
This is the first study of the impact of sovereign 
ratings that finds a significant difference bet-
ween the effect of rating changes in emerging 
and developed markets. Brooks et al. (2002) 
find no significant difference between the effect 
of rating changes in emerging and developed 
countries. The conflicting results can be explai-
ned by a different sample period and methodo-
logy. We study rating changes focusing on the 
1990’s, while Brooks et al. (2002) consider 
rating changes starting in 1973. The earlier 
sample period is characterized by a smaller 
level of financial integration among developed 
countries and also by a smaller number of deve-
loped countries. Also, some emerging countries 
had their status raised to developed during the 
1990’s (e.g. Portugal and Greece). In addition, 
we directly address this issue by dividing the 
sample (rating changes) by the country level of 
development, while Brooks et al. (2002) test for 
a different impact using a dummy variable for 
emerging countries in a cross-sectional regres-
sion.
4.2. Long-Run Performance 
Table 8 and 9 present the long-run impact follo-
wing rating changes in emerging and developed 
markets. Table 8 reports stock market index 
average cumulative abnormal returns for seve-
ral windows, from one-month to twenty four-
months after the event. The event window starts 
ten days before the rating change announce-
ment and abnormal returns are calculated as the 
difference between daily returns of the stock 
market index (calculated in U.S. dollars) and 
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Table 8 
Long-Run Stock Market Reaction to Rating Changes
This table reports cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) as measures of stock market long-run reaction to 
rating changes. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. N is the 
number of available events.
Panel A - Emerging Stock Markets
1 month 3 months 6 months 12 months 24 months
Sovereign upgrades
CAR -0.0028 -0.0057 -0.0264 -0.0819 -0.3823
t-statistic -0.1677 -0.2296 -0.7791 -1.7336 * -5.0397 ***
N = 89 87 85 81 61
Sovereign downgrades
CAR -0.1311 -0.2288 -0.2861 -0.1356 -0.2132
t-statistic -3.5683 *** -4.1537 *** -4.1714 *** -1.5089 -1.6221
N = 62 61 60 53 42
Panel B - Developed Stock Markets
1 month 3 months 6 months 12 months 24 months
Sovereign upgrades
CAR 0.0175 -0.0349 -0.0181 -0.1041 -0.1772
t-statistic 0.5871 -0.7034 -0.2512 -0.8612 -1.0177
N = 13 13 13 10 7
Sovereign downgrades
CAR 0.0266 -0.0262 -0.0351 -0.1476 -0.1177
t-statistic 0.7650 -0.4435 -0.4309 -1.2116 -0.6134
N = 9 9 8 6 3
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Table 9 
Long-Run Bond Market Reaction to Rating Changes 
This table reports cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) as measures of bond market long-run reaction to 
rating changes. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. N is the 
number of available events. 
Panel A - Emerging Bond Markets
1 month 3 months 6 months 12 months 24 months
Sovereign upgrades
CR -0.0381 -0.1305 -0.1021 -0.1594 -0.3053
t-statistic -1.0503 -2.3903 ** -1.4999 -1.3334 -1.1843
N = 66 65 58 54 30
Sovereign downgrades
CR 0.2482 0.3424 0.3968 0.0366 -0.4150
t-statistic 4.6470 *** 4.4367 *** 3.8196 *** 0.3014 -2.1720 **
N = 41 40 35 31 21
Panel B - Developed Bond Markets
1 month 3 months 6 months 12 months 24 months
Sovereign upgrades
CAR -0.0242 -0.0067 0.0402 0.1374 0.2869
t-statistic -1.1099 -0.1885 0.7864 1.7145 * 2.3247 **
N = 16 15 12 9 7
Sovereign downgrades
CAR 0.0332 0.0298 -0.0205 0.1343 0.3711
t-statistic 0.6668 0.3345 -0.1552 0.7073 1.2372
N = 9 8 7 5 2
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the U.S. stock market index. Table 9 reports 
similar information for the government bond 
market. The bond market abnormal return is 
given by the difference between the rate of 
return of 10-year zero coupon bonds between 
the developed country and the U.S., or in the 
case of emerging countries, by the rate of return 
calculated from the EMBI spread relative to the 
U.S. Treasuries. Panel A refers to the impact in 
emerging markets while Panel B refers to the 
impact in developed markets. 
Panel A of Table 8 shows evidence that rating 
upgrades have no significant impact on emer-
ging stock markets, while downgrades have a 
significant negative impact at the 1% level for 
the one-, three- and six-month windows. The 
impact for horizons longer than six-month is 
still considerably negative, but not significant at 
the 5% level. In contrast, the long-run results in 
Panel B of Table 8 supports the short-run fin-
ding that there is no significant impact in deve-
loped stock markets following rating downgra-
des and upgrades. 
Table 9 presents the government bond market 
long-run reaction to rating changes. Panel A of 
Table 9 shows a significant negative return res-
ponse at the 1% significance level (recall that 
the table reports a positive yield impact) of 
emerging bond markets following a rating 
downgrade until six months after the event. 
This result is consistent with the negative short-
run impact found in emerging bond markets. 
Rating upgrades have a positive return impact 
in emerging bond markets. However, the 
impact is generally not statistically significant, 
with the exception of the three-month window.  
This is again consistent with the short-run 
impact in emerging bond markets. 
The results in Panel B of Table 9 for developed 
countries show that bond markets are not signi-
ficantly affected either by rating downgrades or 
upgrades. Recall that rating downgrades present 
a negative impact in developed government 
bond markets using a ten-day window around 
the rating change announcement.  
In summary, our results show that upgrades do 
not have a significant wealth impact either in 
emerging and developed countries financial 
markets. In contrast, sovereign debt downgra-
des have a negative short-run return performan-
ce in the sovereign bond markets of developed 
countries and, especially, emerging countries. 
While this negative performance spills over to 
stock markets in emerging countries, the negati-
ve performance is only significant in bond mar-
kets in the case of developed countries. Further-
more, the short-run performance persists up to 
six months after the event in both the bond and 
stock markets of emerging countries. 
Figures 1-4 plot the average CAR following 
upgrades and downgrades during the event win-
dow around the rating change announcement. 
Figure 1 and 2 display the stock market reaction 
in emerging and developed countries, respecti-
vely. Figure 3 and 4 show bond markets res-
ponse for emerging and developed markets, 
respectively. Panels A.1 and A.2 plot the avera-
ge CAR using a six-month window following 
upgrades and downgrades, respectively. Panels 
B.1 and B.2 plot the average CAR using a 
twenty four-month window following upgrades 
and downgrades, respectively. These figures 
can shed some light on the hypothesis that 
rating agencies may cause financial excess by 
behaving pro-cyclically.  
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Figure 1 
Emerging Stock Markets Reaction
Figures plot the dynamics of stock market spreads in emerging markets when foreign currency sovereign debt 
ratings change.  
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Figure 2 
Developed Stock Markets Reaction
Figures plot the dynamics of stock market spreads in developed markets when local currency sovereign debt 
ratings change.  
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Figure 3 
Emerging Bond Markets Reaction
Figures plot the dynamics of bond market spreads in emerging markets when foreign currency sovereign debt 
ratings change.  
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Figure 4 
Developed Bond Markets’ Reaction
Figures plot the dynamics of bond market spreads in developed markets when local currency sovereign debt 
ratings change. 
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From the evolution of emerging stock and bond 
markets following rating downgrades, we con-
clude that rating agencies behave pro-
cyclically. Rating agencies decide to downgra-
de when a country’s financial markets are 
already having a negative performance (during 
the ten days prior to the rating announcement). 
We interpret this result as evidence of pro-
cyclical behaviour of rating agencies. Alternati-
vely, the behavior of prices in the days prece-
ding rating changes could also reflect an antici-
pation effect. Market participants anticipate the 
rating downgrades, and consequently markets 
incorporate this information in the prices even 
before the rating announcement. 
After the rating downgrade announcement, the 
negative market reaction persists for six 
months, both in stock and bond emerging mar-
kets. This negative performance persists after 
twelve and twenty four months following the 
downgrade in the case of the bond and stock 
market in emerging countries. 
This evidence supports the hypothesis that 
rating agencies contribute to amplifying the 
boom-bust pattern in emerging markets, and 
that downgrades tend to occur when emerging 
market are already collapsing.  
4.3. Robustness Checks 
To examine the robustness of our results for the 
impact of rating changes in emerging stock 
market performance, we replicate the event 
study using an alternative model to calculate the 
abnormal returns. The most common approach 
in individual stocks event studies is to use the 
market model; see, for example, Brown and 
Warner (1980). Daily risk adjusted abnormal 
stock market returns are calculated using the 
market model: 
(11)
where Rit is the return on the stock market of 
country i on day t, Rmt is the corresponding 
return on the U.S. stock market index on day t,
and ai and bi are the market model parameters. 
Notice that our stock market spreads (difference 
between country’s and US stock market 
returns) are given by a special case of the mar-
ket model with ai = 0 and bi = 1. 
The market model parameters are estimated 
using weekly stock market returns from the 
country’s with rating change and from the 
benchmark (U.S.) in the six months prior to the 
event announcement (beginning 130 days prior 
to the event and ending 11 days before the 
event announcement). We use weekly returns 
(as opposed to daily) to avoid the non-
synchronous estimation bias that arises from 
different trading hours across countries. 
Table 10 reports the short-run performance of 
emerging stock markets following rating chan-
ges using risk adjusted abnormal returns. The 
results show that our main findings are not 
changed by the use of risk adjusted abnormal 
returns. Rating downgrades in the emerging 
markets are associated with statistically signifi-
cant negative CARs at the 5% level from day -6 
until day 10, while rating upgrades do not have 
any short term impact on stock markets returns. 
We also replicate our long-run impact results in 
emerging stock markets using abnormal returns 
derived from the market model. Table 11 shows 
the results that are consistent with our main 
results using stock market spreads. There is a 
statistically significant response at the 1% level 
on emerging stock markets until six-month after 
a rating downgrade. While downgrades have a 
negative and persistent effect in emerging stock 
markets, upgrades do not have a significant 
effect.
)(,, mtiititi RRAR
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Table 10 
Short-Run Emerging Stock Market Reaction to Rating Changes: Market Model 
This table reports average abnormal returns (AR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) as measures of the 
emerging stock market short-run reaction to rating changes. Abnormal returns are derived from the market 
model. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. N is the number 
of available events. 
Event Upgrades Downgrades
Day AR t-stat CAR t-stat AR t-stat CAR t-stat
-10 -0.0029 -0.8633 -0.0029 -0.8633 -0.0108 -0.9340 -0.0108 -0.9340
-9 -0.0017 -0.6616 -0.0046 -1.0876 -0.0094 -0.7847 -0.0202 -1.2135
-8 -0.0040 -1.4469 -0.0086 -1.7021 * -0.0112 -0.8947 -0.0315 -1.5076
-7 -0.0002 -0.0522 -0.0087 -1.4992 -0.0139 -1.1190 -0.0454 -1.8679 *
-6 -0.0049 -1.7267 * -0.0136 -2.1014 ** -0.0148 -1.1379 -0.0602 -2.1839 **
-5 0.0037 0.9360 -0.0099 -1.3007 -0.0040 -0.3017 -0.0642 -2.0996 **
-4 -0.0002 -0.0742 -0.0101 -1.2200 -0.0114 -0.9092 -0.0756 -2.2875 **
-3 0.0012 0.5142 -0.0090 -1.0407 -0.0002 -0.0171 -0.0758 -2.1264 **
-2 0.0019 0.7942 -0.0070 -0.7828 -0.0112 -0.8432 -0.0870 -2.2869 **
-1 0.0007 0.1992 -0.0063 -0.6555 -0.0130 -0.9334 -0.0999 -2.4684 **
0 -0.0029 -1.3498 -0.0092 -0.9374 -0.0077 -0.6396 -0.1076 -2.5484 **
1 -0.0025 -0.7728 -0.0117 -1.1302 -0.0203 -1.5351 -0.1279 -2.8911 ***
2 0.0030 1.2259 -0.0087 -0.8152 -0.0131 -1.0467 -0.1410 -3.0668 ***
3 -0.0037 -1.4174 -0.0124 -1.1287 0.0058 0.4351 -0.1352 -2.8263 ***
4 0.0014 0.3160 -0.0110 -0.9294 -0.0011 -0.0787 -0.1363 -2.7408 ***
5 -0.0020 -0.6392 -0.0130 -1.0627 -0.0080 -0.6203 -0.1443 -2.8086 ***
6 0.0001 0.0166 -0.0129 -1.0275 0.0006 0.0494 -0.1437 -2.7124 ***
7 -0.0019 -0.7785 -0.0149 -1.1578 -0.0050 -0.4012 -0.1487 -2.7320 ***
8 -0.0004 -0.1580 -0.0153 -1.1648 -0.0119 -0.8983 -0.1607 -2.8671 ***
9 -0.0010 -0.4772 -0.0163 -1.2235 -0.0124 -0.9776 -0.1731 -3.0122 ***
10 0.0001 0.0456 -0.0162 -1.1970 -0.0083 -0.6924 -0.1814 -3.0901 ***
N = 85 N = 61
Table 11 
Long-Run Emerging Stock Market Reaction to Rating Changes: Market Model
This table reports cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) as measures of the emerging stock market long-run 
reaction to rating changes. Abnormal returns are derived from the market model. *, ** and *** denote statis-
tical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level. N is the number of available events. 
1 month 3 months 6 months 12 months 24 months
Sovereign upgrades
CAR -0.0044 -0.0023 0.0140 0.0730 0.4051
t-statistic -0.2305 -0.0819 0.3488 1.2541 * 4.1653 ***
N = 85 83 81 77 57
Sovereign downgrades
CAR -0.2690 -0.5727 -1.0520 -0.0453 -1.2472
t-statistic -3.2692 *** -4.4117 *** -5.9051 *** -0.1796 -2.8285 ***
N = 61 60 59 52 41
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Figure 5 shows stock markets’ response to 
foreign currency debt ratings change, using 
cumulative abnormal derived from the market 
model, for the emerging countries. 
Figure 5 
Emerging Stock Markets Reaction: Market Model
Figures plot the dynamics of stock market spreads in emerging markets when foreign currency sovereign debt    
ratings change. Abnormal returns are derived from the market model. 
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5. CONCLUSION
Financial integration has made investors, and 
particularly fund managers, increasingly inte-
rested in international diversification. The for-
mation of international portfolios requires a 
range of fundamental inputs in the asset alloca-
tion decision. In particular, a change in Sove-
reign ratings is one such key event that may 
trigger substantial recomposition of internatio-
nal portfolios.  
This paper contributes to the literature on the 
effects of credit ratings on financial markets by 
examining the impact of Sovereign rating chan-
ges on the country’s bond and stock markets. 
This is the first study to examine not only the 
short-run impact of rating changes, but also to 
analyze the long-run impact in both developed 
and emerging financial markets. 
Sovereign ratings' downgrades convey informa-
tion about subsequent financial market returns, 
in contrast with upgrades that have no informa-
tion. Government bond market spreads relative 
to the benchmark (U.S.) are significantly nega-
tive affected by rating downgrades, especially 
in emerging markets. While this negative per-
formance spills over to stock markets in the 
case of emerging countries, in the case of    
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developed markets only the government bond 
market is affected. Moreover, we find that the 
effects of rating downgrades in both stock and 
bond emerging markets persist up to six months 
after the event. In fact, the effect in the develo-
ped countries is felt only in the bond markets 
and in the days around a downgrade.  
Finally, we find that rating agencies act pro-
cyclically, downgrading countries in bad times. 
In this sense, rating agencies might add instabi-
lity to financial markets in emerging econo-
mies. Rating agencies provide bad news at bad 
times and, just reinforce investors’ expecta-
tions.
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